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INTRODUCTION 
“Social media is a virtual world that is filled with half bots, half real people 
. . . . You can’t take any tweet at face value. And not everything is what it 
seems.”—Rami Essaid, founder of Distil Networks1 
In 2017, more than three billion people logged on to social media net-
works.2 Increasingly, judges sitting in county, state, and federal courts in the 
United States have joined the ranks of social media users. Judges post on social 
media. They engage followers on Twitter and friends on Facebook. Like other 
humans using social media, judges may unwittingly encounter bots simulating 
human behavior or “bubbles” created by algorithms. 
This article is the first to examine at length the potential threat to judicial 
impartiality arising from judges interacting with bots and bubbles—both pre-
sent, known phenomena on social media. While much scholarly literature has 
delved into ethical issues implicated by judges’ social media contacts, very lit-
tle attention has been focused on the impact of automated bots and algorithmic 
bubbles on judges’ impartiality.3 This article is an effort to begin addressing 
that literature gap. 
                                                        
1  Nicholas Confessore et al., The Follower Factory, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://ww 
w.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/technology/social-media-bots.html [https://perma.cc/ 
8DKW-MDBF]. 
2  Id.; see also Evan Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democra-
cy?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-
mark-zuckerberg-fix-facebook-before-it-breaks-democracy [https://perma.cc/HK6Y-5SM4] 
(“If Facebook were a country, it would have the largest population on earth. More than 2.2 
billion people, about a third of humanity, log in at least once a month. That user base has no 
precedent in the history of American enterprise.”). 
3  See, e.g., Nichola A. Boothe-Perry, Friends of Justice: Does Social Media Impact the Pub-
lic Perception of the Justice System?, 35 PACE L. REV. 72, 92 (2014) (stating that without 
“recognition of the need for guidance and oversight of judge’s ‘friend’ships to prevent [ap-
pearance] of a sense of impropriety[,]the public’s perception that unscrupulous or unprofes-
sional behavior has occurred may stir beliefs that justice is not being conducted in a timely, 
fair or equitable manner, thus undermining the public’s confidence in the justice system.”); 
John G. Browning, The Judge as Digital Citizen: Pros, Cons, and Ethical Limitations on 
Judicial Use of New Media, 8 FAULKNER L. REV. 131, 154 (2016) (“Certainly, judges should 
exercise caution in using social media, just as they should in more traditional avenues of 
communication—including no ex parte communications and no independent investigation of 
a case. But, unless we want them to be philosopher-priests cloistered in their jurisprudential 
temples, judges need to be connected to society, with their work reflecting accessibility to 
the citizens they serve.”); Hope A. Comisky & William M. Taylor, Don’t Be a Twit: Avoid-
ing the Ethical Pitfalls Facing Lawyers Utilizing Social Media in Three Important Arenas—
Discovery, Communications with Judges and Jurors, and Marketing, 20 TEMP. POL. & C. R. 
L. REV. 297, 310–11 (2011) (“[O]nce two people are ‘friends,’ they can monitor each other’s 
profiles even though they are not directly communicating with each other . . . . Social net-
working sites then pose the risk that an attorney may, intentionally or not, review any post-
ings that inform the attorney about the judge’s mood, temperament, or preferences or, of 
more concern, postings that a judge inappropriately makes about a case . . . . [A]t the start of 
any case in which an attorney appears before a judge whom he has ‘friended’ or who belongs 
to the same network as the judge, the attorney and the judge should ‘defriend’ one anoth-
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Social media bots, automated accounts run by algorithm, can simulate hu-
man interaction on social media.4 Social media bubbles, online cocoons where 
users interact primarily with content that confirm their existing conclusions, 
can arise from user selections or algorithms deployed by social media compa-
nies, or both. 
In their more malicious forms, bots and bubbles on social media present 
potentially unprecedented risks not encountered on other types of media, like 
television or radio. These heightened risks arise from the speed and frequency 
at which social media networks can spread and amplify falsehoods and echo 
chamber effects. Bots, not inherently malicious, can be designed to manipulate 
public opinion and spread falsehoods on social media.5 Bubbles can enhance 
the impact of bots; social media users in bubbles can more easily believe in a 
false assertion.6 In bubbles, users may experience an echo chamber effect and 
see only information that confirms their opinions and conclusions.7 The term 
“filter bubble” refers to the unique, personalized information created for a user 
through algorithms that draw from that user’s web activity history.8 A user’s 
previous internet use—that might include viewing, following links, and pur-
chasing—feed into algorithms that then determine content for that user.9 Per-
                                                                                                                                
er.”). A notable welcome exception is Professor Elizabeth Thornburg’s discussion of bots 
and “data-driven echo chamber effects” in her recent article about judges on Twitter. Eliza-
beth Thornburg, Twitter and the #So-CalledJudge, 71 SMU L. REV. 249, 300, 313 (2018). 
Professor Thornburg’s article focuses on how judges can continue to communicate with the 
public on Twitter in a constructive way. Id. at 306. This article builds from Professor Thorn-
burg’s work. 
4  See Confessore et al., supra note 1; Stefan Wojcik et al., Bots in the Twittersphere, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/04/09/bots-in-the-twittersphere/ 
[https://perma.cc/3JYQ-YV6E]. 
5  Confessore et al., supra note 1; Onur Varol et al., Online Human-Bot Interactions: Detec-
tion, Estimation, and Characterization, 11 INT’L AAAI CONF. ON WEB & SOCIAL MEDIA 280, 
280 (2017), https://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM17/paper/view/15587/14817 [htt 
ps://perma.cc/DKL8-PCCH]; see also Joanna M. Burkhardt, Social Media Bots: How They 
Spread Misinformation, AM. LIBRARIES MAG. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://americanlibrariesmagaz 
ine.org/2018/03/01/social-media-bots/ [https://perma.cc/637J-PT5N] (“People who are una-
ware that they are interacting with a bot can easily be supplied with false information . . . . 
People with a large network of friends are more likely to accept requests from people they 
don’t know. This can make it relatively easy for bots to infiltrate a network of social media 
users.”). Siri on iPhones and Alexa on Amazon Echo devices are bots; people use them to 
listen to music, make purchases, and check the weather. Judith Shulevitz, Alexa, Should We 
Trust You?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/ 
alexa-how-will-you-change-us/570844/. Beyond the scope of this article, privacy concerns 
raised by use of Alexa, Siri, and other bots have been discussed by other scholars. See, e.g., 
Margot E. Kaminski et al., Averting Robot Eyes, 76 MD. L. REV. 983, 984 (2017). 
6  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 11 
(2017) (“Echo chambers can lead people to believe in falsehoods, and it may be difficult or 
impossible to correct them. Falsehoods take a toll.”). 
7  See id. at 115–16. 
8  ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE 9 (2011); see also Eytan Bakshy et al., Exposure to Ideo-
logically Diverse News and Opinion on Facebook, 348 SCI. 1130, 1130 (2015). 
9  Bakshy et al., supra note 8, at 1130. 
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sonalization, by algorithm or by self-selection, can lead to users “eating the 
equivalent of information junk food” and leave them vulnerable to assertions 
set out as “facts.”10 
Attempts to moderate or eliminate harmful bots and bubble effects are ap-
parently in process but the potential for harm is not going away anytime soon.11 
Although social media companies have announced efforts to keep in check the 
use of both bots and filter bubbles, it is unclear how successful those efforts 
have been.12 In recent years, lawmakers have introduced legislation designed to 
curb the impact of malicious bots.13 In California, legislators passed such a 
bill.14 But, nothing yet exists that comes close to eradicating harmful bots and 
bubbles from social media. 
Like other social media users, judges may be interacting with fake social 
media accounts designed to manipulate public opinion or spread falsehoods or 
unverified information. Perhaps at the very same time, judges may be caught in 
a bubble created by social media platform algorithms that make it more diffi-
cult for the human user to encounter opinions, ideas, and arguments different 
than their own.15 
Meanwhile, judges are expected to be impartial. Impartiality has long been 
a cornerstone of the judicial role.16 The canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
for U.S. Judges and the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Model Rules of 
                                                        
10  The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You, AMAZON.COM, https://www.ama 
zon.com/Filter-Bubble-What-Internet-Hiding-dp-1594203008/dp/1594203008 (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2019) (hosting a Q&A with the author). 
11  PARISER, supra note 8, at 14–15. 
12  See infra Section II.C. 
13  See infra Section II.A. 
14  See infra Section II.A. 
15  Further, any pernicious impact of bubbles and bots may be enhanced by any isolation 
judges feel after ascending to the bench. See Isaiah M. Zimmerman, Isolation in the Judicial 
Career, 36 CT. REV. 4, 4 (2000). 
16  See Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 
2011 BYU L. REV. 943, 950 (2011) (“The American legal system is based on a simple and 
noncontroversial proposition: a fair and neutral judge is essential to the operation of a just 
legal system.”); Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiali-
ty, 97 IOWA L. REV. 181, 183 (2011) (emphasis added) (“The notion of an impartial trial un-
der the direction of an unbiased judge is a central tenet of our system of justice.”) (emphasis 
added); Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 
493, 498 (2013) (“Impartiality . . . has been a defining feature of the judicial role dating back 
to antiquity.”). 
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Judicial Conduct emphasize judicial impartiality.17 Judges are subject to re-
strictions aimed at preserving impartiality.18 
With social media bots and bubbles that put social media users at greater 
risk of believing falsehoods and of seeing only what confirms their own beliefs, 
judicial impartiality, a central feature of the judicial system, may be under 
threat at a level not encountered in the past. In this article, I argue for increased 
precautions and awareness to help maintain judicial impartiality in light of the 
potential unfortunate impact of social media bots and bubbles.19 
Part I introduces social media platforms and judges’ presence on social 
media. It also provides a basic overview of judicial conduct rules emphasizing 
impartiality while encouraging “extrajudicial” activities. Part II explains how 
social media bots and bubbles work, their potential harmful impact, and how 
their existence and harmful impacts may be limited. Part III discusses the lim-
ited breadth of current judicial ethics rules and standards concerning social me-
dia use. Part IV will describe possible ways in which malicious effects of social 
media bots and bubbles are currently mitigated. It will then propose precautions 
to help maintain judicial impartiality in the presence of social media bots and 
bubbles. Ultimately, this article offers an outlook on the ethical landscape of 
judges engaging on social media that is at once deeply skeptical and cautiously 
hopeful. 
                                                        
17  Canon Two of the Code of Judicial Conduct for U.S. Judges provides that a judge should 
“act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality 
of the judiciary.” Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 2A GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY 
Canon 2A (Mar. 12, 2019). Canon Two of the ABA Model Rules of Judicial Conduct states, 
“A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently.” 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2011). 
18  For example, judges may not initiate or permit ex parte communications concerning a 
pending matter. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.9(A) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2011). Also, 
judges may not form relationships with persons that would convey an impression that those 
persons are in a position to influence the judge. Id. at r. 2.4(C). This article focuses on judg-
es’ use of social media and not on judicial clerks’ use of social media. However, much of 
what is discussed in this article would apply to judicial clerks. The Code of Conduct for Ju-
dicial Employees provides that judicial employees must “[a]void [i]mpropriety and the 
[a]ppearance of [i]mpropriety in [a]ll [a]ctivities[.]” Code of Conduct for Judicial Employ-
ees, 2A GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 320 (Aug. 2, 2013). Also, others have provided guid-
ance on ethical and professionalism issues related to judicial clerks’ use of social media. See 
ABIGAIL L. PERDUE, THE ALL-INCLUSIVE GUIDE TO JUDICIAL CLERKING 149–52, 178 (2017). 
19  See Thornburg, supra note 3, at 253 (“[I]n this day and age, when much of America gets 
its news from social media and those platforms are being used to delegitimize the judiciary, 
the third branch can ill afford to disengage. Judicial tweeting, within the limits of the ethics 
rules, should be encouraged rather than shunned.”); David Lat, Judges on Twitter: Is This a 
Problem?, ABOVE LAW (Sept. 30, 2014, 2:18 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2014/09/judges-
on-twitter-is-this-a-problem/ [https://perma.cc/NGQ9-LVQ3] (“[J]udges who blog or tweet 
help improve public understanding of the courts and increase the transparency and accounta-
bility of the judicial system. Judges just need to exercise sound judgment—which, of course, 
is what we pay them to do. So I say: tweet away, Your Honors!”). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Social Media Platforms 
Social media is a prevalent part of human interactions around the world. In 
the first quarter of 2018, Facebook reported 1.449 billion daily active users and 
241 million monthly active users in the U.S. and Canada.20 68 percent of adults 
in the U.S. report being Facebook users.21 Facebook is the most-used social 
media platform in the U.S.22 The most commonly used social media platforms 
include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, Snapchat, and 
WhatsApp.23 
Social media platforms are “forms of electronic communication (such as 
websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create 
online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other 
content (such as videos).”24 People use social media for varied reasons, includ-
ing keeping in touch with friends and family, publicizing their careers and 
businesses, connecting with people with similar interests, gathering information 
                                                        
20  Josh Constine, Facebook Beats in Q1 and Boosts Daily User Growth to 1.45B Amidst 
Backlash, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 25, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/25/facebook-q1-20 
18-earnings/ [https://perma.cc/5EUZ-NNVD]. 
21  AARON SMITH & MONICA ANDERSON, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA USE IN 2018, at 
2 (2018), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2018/03/01105133/PI_2 
018.03.01_Social-Media_FINAL.pdf. 
22  Id. 
23  Id.; see generally FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ [https://perma.cc/4ZMP-S4JE] 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2019); INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/ [http://perma.cc/TJW4 
-DADM] (last visited Mar. 10, 2019); LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/ [https://perma.c 
c/N69M-4FJ5] (last visited Mar. 10, 2019); SNAPCHAT, https://www.snapchat.com/ [https://p 
erma.cc/XQ7C-9Q6K] (last visited Mar. 10, 2019); TWITTER, https://www.twitter.com/ [http 
s://perma.cc/7TQQ-DXRF] (last visited Mar. 10, 2019); WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp. 
com/ [https://perma.cc/E8G2-Q9EK] (last visited Mar. 10, 2019); YOUTUBE, https://www.yo 
utube.com/ [https://perma.cc/6GK2-ZQN4] (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). This article will fo-
cus primarily on Facebook and Twitter, due to the appearance of judges on them, and the 
availability of information and studies concerning them. 
24  Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social% 
20media (last visited Mar. 10, 2019); see also Cynthia Gray, Social Media and Judicial Eth-
ics: Part 1, 39 JUD. CONDUCT REP. 2, 2 (2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Top 
ics/Center%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/JCR/JCR_Spring_2017.ashx [https://perma.cc/X3U 
Z-ELRY]. (“Social media are web-based services on which individuals share information, 
ideas, interests, activities, photos, and videos through virtual communities and networks us-
ing electronic devices. Types of social media include social and professional networking 
sites (such as Facebook and LinkedIn), review sites (such as Yelp and TripAdvisor), sites for 
sharing photos, images, and videos (such as Instagram, YouTube, Pinterest, and Snapchat), 
blogs, micro-blogs (such as Twitter and Tumblr), information web-sites that allow changes, 
contributions, or corrections (such as Wikipedia), question-and-answer sites (such as Quora), 
and discussion groups and threads (such as Reddit).”). 
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and news, and airing and challenging political views.25 About a quarter of 
adults in the U.S. get news from two or more social media sites.26 Facebook is a 
common source, with about 45 percent of adults in the U.S. getting news from 
there.27 More than half of adults in the U.S. aged fifty or older report getting 
news on social media sites.28 About 18 percent and 11 percent of adults in the 
U.S. turn to YouTube or Twitter, respectively, for news.29 
Not all social media platforms serve the same purpose. For example, Face-
book is different than Twitter because Facebook’s users are more often people 
who have ties based on offline social contexts (like family members connected 
on Facebook) rather than topical interests (like people on Twitter who have an 
interest in mindfulness and lawyer well-being).30 
But, in addition to those seemingly harmless uses, social media have also 
been a platform for crime, terrorism, bullying, death threats, and election ma-
nipulation.31 In 2012, the New York Times reported that Russian hackers ac-
                                                        
25  See AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHY AMERICANS USE SOCIAL MEDIA 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Why-Americans-Use-Social-Media. 
aspx; Donna L. Hoffman & Thomas P. Novak, Why Do People Use Social Media? Empiri-
cal Findings and a New Theoretical Framework for Social Media Goal Pursuit 30 tbl.4 
(Nat’l Sci. Found., Grant No. IIS-1114828 Jan. 17, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper 
s.cfm?abstract_id=1989586 [https://perma.cc/GQ2K-QZ6G]. 
26  Natasha Lomas, Even More US Adults Now Getting News from Social Media, Says Pew, 
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 9, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/09/even-more-us-adults-now-
getting-news-from-social-media-says-pew/ [http://perma.cc/Q4HB-RXZ3]. Prevalence of 
use, however, should not be equated with depth of trust or confidence. SMITH & ANDERSON, 
supra note 21, at 7. The 2018 Pew study on social media use found that a mere 3 percent of 
social media users in the United States indicate they have “a lot of trust” in the sites they use. 
Id. 
27  Lomas, supra note 26. 
28  Id. 
29  Id.; Professor Elizabeth Thornburg has discussed how people use Twitter: 
An American Press Institute survey in 2015 found that “81% [of Twitter users] keep up with the 
news at least daily” (71% use it several times a day). But they are not merely consumers of in-
formation. Thirty one percent say they use Twitter “to tell others what I am doing and thinking 
about,” 24% “to ‘keep in touch with people I know,’ ” 19% “[t]o share news” and “[t]o net-
work,” and 18% “[t]o follow trending topics.” 
Thornburg, supra note 3, at 256 (alterations in original) (quoting Tom Rosenstiel et al., How 
People Use Twitter in General, AM. PRESS INST. (Sept. 1, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.ame 
ricanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/how-people-use-twitter-in-gener 
al/). 
30  Bakshy et al., supra note 8, at 1131. 
31  See, e.g., Kate Starbird, Examining the Alternative Media Ecosystem Through the Produc-
tion of Alternative Narratives of Mass Shooting Events on Twitter, U. WASH. (2017), http://fa 
culty.washington.edu/kstarbi/Alt_Narratives_ICWSM17-CameraReady.pdf. In an interview, 
Professor Starbird commented: 
Your brain tells you “Hey, I got this from three different sources[.]” . . . But you don’t realize it 
all traces back to the same place, and might have even reached you via bots posing as real peo-
ple. If we think of this as a virus, I wouldn’t know how to vaccinate for it. 
Danny Westneat, UW Professor: The Information War Is Real, and We’re Losing It, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politic 
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cessed the computer of a Pentagon official: “But the attack didn’t come through 
an email or a file buried within a seemingly innocuous document. A link, at-
tached to a Twitter post put out by a robot account, promised a family-friendly 
vacation package for the summer.”32 
B. Judges on Social Media 
Many judges use social media. In 2012, more than 46 percent of judges 
surveyed for a study used a social media profile site, with Facebook being the 
most popular choice of over 86 percent of users.33 In 2010, a survey of state 
and local judges revealed approximately 40 percent of judges used social me-
dia.34 For a 2014 survey, more than 42 percent of responding court officials 
agreed it is necessary and only 26 percent saw it as unnecessary.35 
Judges can have a substantial social media following, though significantly 
fewer than a popular award-winning musical artist. For example, in March 
2019, Chief Judge Dillard (@JudgeDillard) had 15,000 followers on Twitter36, 
Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett) had 108,000 followers on Twitter37 and 
more than 19,000 followers on Facebook,38 Judge Rosemarie Aquilina 
                                                                                                                                
s/uw-professor-the-information-war-is-real-and-were-losing-it/ [https://perma.cc/R2LW-P6 
AF]. 
32  Sheera Frenkel, Hackers Hide Cyberattacks in Social Media Posts, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/technology/hackers-hide-cyberattacks-in-social 
-media-posts.html [https://perma.cc/EHS4-CKJV]. 
33  NEW MEDIA COMM. OF THE CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS, 2012 CCPIO 
NEW MEDIA SURVEY 5 (2012), http://ccpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/CCOIO-2012-N 
ew-Media-ReportFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6GU-R96C]. 
34  NEW MEDIA COMM. OF THE CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS, NEW MEDIA AND 
THE COURTS 8 (2010), https://ccpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/2010-ccpio-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S9B6-XSER]. 
35  CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS, 2014 CCPIO NEW MEDIA SURVEY 4 (2014), 
https://ccpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CCPIO-New-Media-survey-report_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F5KF-NA7Z]. 
36  Chief Judge Dillard (@JudgeDillard), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/JudgeDillard [https://p 
erma.cc/7QHP-9Y4R] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). As of March 11, 2019, Chief Judge 
Dillard was tweeting daily. Id. 
37  Justice Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/JusticeWillett [https://per 
ma.cc/JN74-REHM] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). As of March 11, 2019, Justice Willett’s 
last Tweet was on January 1, 2018, which coincides with the beginning of his service on the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Justice Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (Jan. 1, 2018, 
5:46 PM), https://twitter.com/JusticeWillett/status/948007590130266112 [https://perma.cc/B 
3DY-ZQM9]; Willett, Don R., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/willett-
don-r [https://perma.cc/BDS8-8EV4] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). In 2015, the Texas legisla-
ture ceremonially named Judge Willett the state’s “Tweeter Laureate.” Kyle Swenson, 
Trump Wants Texas’s “Tweeter Laureate” Judge on Federal Appeals Court, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/09/29/trump 
-wants-texass-twitter-laureate-judge-on-federal-appeals-court/ [https://perma.cc/G2DH-AW 
QS]. 
38  Justice Willett (@JusticeDonWillett), FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/JusticeDon 
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(@AquiRosemarie) had more than 5,600 followers on Twitter,39 Chief Justice 
Elizabeth D. Walker (@bethwalkr) had more than 3,900 followers on Twitter,40 
and Judge Carla Wong McMillan had more than 3,100 followers on Twitter.41 
As of March 11, 2019, musical artist Beyoncé had more than 58 million fol-
lowers on Facebook42 and nearly 15 million followers on Twitter.43 
In her article about judges on Twitter, Professor Thornburg discussed rea-
sons why judges use the social media platform: “In a general sense, . . . for the 
                                                                                                                                
Willett/ [https://perma.cc/F9Z7-Q8CM] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). As of March 11, 2019, 
Justice Willett’s last Facebook post was on January 1, 2018. Id. 
39  Judge Rosemarie Aquilina (@AquiRosemarie), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/AquiRosema 
rie [https://perma.cc/64D8-9EVU] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). As of March 11, 2019, Judge 
Aquilina was tweeting nearly every day. Id. A state judge, she serves on the 30th Circuit 
Court for Ingham County, Michigan. Honorable Rosemarie E. Aquilina, INGHAM CTY. 
MICH., http://cc.ingham.org/GeneralInformation/Judges/HonorableRosemarieEAquilina.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/F9QD-F39P] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). Judge Aquilina presided over the 
trial and sentencing of former gymnastics team doctor Larry Nasser, who was sentenced to 
between 40 and 175 years for sexual abuse crimes. Scott Cacciola & Victor Mather, Larry 
Nassar Sentencing: “I Just Signed Your Death Warrant”, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/sports/larry-nassar-sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/3 
6KX-GMU9]. On Twitter, she regularly expresses support for survivors of sexual abuse. 
@AquiRosemarie, supra. For example, on November 30, 2018, she tweeted in response to a 
tweet by a user saying the user had just reported a rape from 1981, “That is amazing! So 
very proud of you and your voice! You are strong!” Rosemarie Aquilina (@AquiRosemarie), 
TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2018, 8:05 PM), https://twitter.com/AquiRosemarie/status/10687177743 
21713153 [https://perma.cc/3PQR-USP8]. 
40  Chief Justice Walker (@bethwalkr), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/bethwalkr [https://perm 
a.cc/QD9N-BFQL] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). Justice Walker is the Chief Justice of the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker, W. VA. 
JUDICIARY, http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/current-justices/justice-walker.html [htt 
ps://perma.cc/97KD-7AW3] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). She regularly tweets on varied top-
ics, such as gratitude or honor for various officials, being an alumnus and fan of The Ohio 
State University, food served at her house, or a legal writing topic. @bethwlkr, supra. On 
Nov. 30, 2018, for example, she tweeted, “Thank you and RIP President George H. W. 
Bush .” Chief Justice Walker (@bethwalkr), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2018, 9:19 PM), 
https://twitter.com/bethwalkr/status/1068736424734806016 [https://perma.cc/69ZX-TY88]. 
41  Judge McMillan (@JudgeCarla), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/JudgeCarla [https://perma.c 
c/S6NT-7P73] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). Recently, Judge McMillan, who serves on the 
Georgia Court of Appeals, has tweeted about her service in the community and updates from 
the Georgia Court of Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court. Id.; Carla McMillian, COURT 
APPEALS GA., https://www.gaappeals.us/biography/bio_judges.php?jname=Carla%20McMill 
ian [https://perma.cc/2VZG-VFR7] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). For example, on November 
10, 2018, she tweeted, “Honored to preside over the semifinal round of the Thomas Tang 
Moot Court Competition with these judges and JAGs. Thanks to Judge Alvin T. Wong (State 
Court of DeKalb) who has overseen this competition for the last 15 years!” Judge McMillan 
(@JudgeCarla), TWITTER (Nov. 10, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://twitter.com/JudgeCarla/status/10 
61382546565533697 [https://perma.cc/BJE4-79FH]. 
42  Beyoncé (@beyonce), FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/beyonce/ [http://perma.cc/9 
99Y-HR3D] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
43  Beyoncé (@Beyonce), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/Beyonce [https://perma.cc/E776-JFS 
U] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). Tweets are rarely posted from @Beyonce. Id. A tweet was 
posted on June 30, 2017, and the next tweet after that was posted on June 16, 2018. Id. 
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same reason everyone else does: to share news and information (personal, pro-
fessional, political, commercial) and to be part of online communities discuss-
ing that information . . . . If a court or a judge wants to reach out to the public, 
social media makes sense.”44 She noted, “More than 42% of public information 
officers agreed in 2014 that using social media is necessary for courts to con-
nect to the public.”45 Consistent with increasing transparency with the public, 
judges can use social media platforms like Twitter to keep the public informed 
about activities at their courts.46 
Twitter has been used for “more interactive outreach.”47 “In April of 2017, 
for example, the Provincial Court of British Columbia held its second annual 
Twitter Town Hall, using the hashtag #AskChiefJudge to allow members of the 
public to ask questions. Georgia’s courts have done the same using 
#AskGAJudges.”48 
Some judges have used social media platforms for their election cam-
paigns.49 A judge’s campaign might, for example, set up a Facebook page to 
promote their candidacy.50 Facebook users can then elect to follow the page for 
campaign updates.51 
Some judges have even enthusiastically advocated for judges’ active use of 
social media. In his 2017 article, It’s Time for Judges to Tweet, Like, and 
Share, Chief Judge Dillard of the Georgia Court of Appeals, urged his judicial 
peers to engage on social media.52 Judge Dillard explained that his primary 
goal on social media is to explain “exactly” what he does as an appellate judge 
in Georgia.53 He discussed using social media to promote excellence in appel-
late practice and act as a “virtual mentor” to law students and young lawyers.54 
On a recent panel, Judge Dillard remarked, “Judges are public servants. [Judg-
es] have to be connected to the people [they] serve . . . . [Judges don’t have] a 
free pass to remain cloistered . . . from society. . . . [N]ow is the time for judges 
                                                        
44  Thornburg, supra note 3, at 256. 
45  Id. at 257. 
46  Id. at 264. (“Courts and judges also use Twitter to keep the public informed about the on-
going activities of their courts. The release of a noteworthy opinion is often announced with 
a tweet. Using the news media as an intermediary, judges also increase transparency and 
public outreach by creating virtual relationships with local news providers by following their 
Twitter accounts and allowing the reporters to live-tweet from the courtroom.”). 
47  Id. at 257–58. 
48  Id. at 258. 
49  graycynthia, Judicial Campaigns on Social Media, JUD. ETHICS & DISCIPLINE (July 19, 
2016), https://ncscjudicialethicsblog.org/2016/07/19/1117/; see also Thornburg, supra note 
3, at 258. 
50  graycynthia, supra note 49. 
51  See id. 
52  Stephen Louis A. Dillard, #Engage: It’s Time for Judges to Tweet, Like, and Share, 101 
JUDICATURE 11, 11–12 (2017), https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judi 
cialstudies/judicature/judicature_101-1_dillard.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PCJ-92M3]. 
53  Id. at 12. 
54  Id. at 13. 
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to embrace social media[,] . . . state judges especially . . . .”55 Judge Steve Leb-
en of the Kansas Court of Appeals tweeted approval of this conclusion by Pro-
fessor Thornburg: “[I]n this day and age, when much of America gets its news 
from social media and those platforms are being used to delegitimize the judi-
ciary, the third branch can ill afford to disengage. Judicial tweeting . . . should 
be encouraged.”56 
Judges who encourage social media use by other judges emphasize the pos-
itive community-building and professionalism aspects of social media engage-
ment in an era of high political polarization.57 For example, Judge Dillard has 
described how professionals engage through the Twitter hashtag #appellatetwit-
ter and how some of them have met over Twitter and then “get together [and] 
have lunch.”58 He commented, “We talk about the vitriol on Twitter. What we 
don’t talk about are . . . the oases of sanity.”59 Judge Dillard has discussed how 
he uses social media to mentor and to promote civility in “divided times” when 
people separate themselves “into these echo chambers.”60 Judge Dillard has 
acknowledged the possibility of judges using poor judgment online but sug-
gested that the “transparency” of social media might help shed light on judges 
who regularly engage in unethical behavior.61 
C. Extrajudicial Activities and Judicial Impartiality 
Outside of social media, judges are frequent public speakers, and the rules 
of ethics allow and even encourage them to engage in community activities.62 
Under the Code of Conduct for federal judges, “extrajudicial activities” include 
                                                        
55  The Federalist Soc’y, Technology, Social Media, and Professional Ethics [NLC 2018], 
YOUTUBE (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTLpBLNeb_o [https://perm 
a.cc/6ZZG-QWTL] (from 51:13–53:10). 
56  Judge Leben (@Judge_Leben), TWITTER (Mar. 28, 2018, 9:14 AM) (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting Thornburg, supra note 3, at 249), https://twitter.com/Judge_Leben/status/97902 
8940386947073 [https://perma.cc/J5FY-MSRM]. 
57  Chief Judge Dillard, of Georgia, and Judge Willett, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, have had a somewhat outsized presence on social media and have been espe-
cially vocal about the need for judges to be on social media. See supra notes 36–41 and ac-
companying text. More information and views from more judges and a more diverse group 
of judges about judicial use of social media may reveal additional views and perspectives. 
This article was finalized in advance of the #TwitterLaw Symposium planned by the Idaho 
Law Review for April 5, 2019; announced speakers include Justice Eva Guzman 
(@JusticeGuzman) of the Supreme Court of Texas and Chief Justice Bridget Mary McCor-
mack (@BridgetMaryMc) of the Supreme Court of Michigan. 
58  The Federalist Soc’y, supra note 55 (from 57:05–57:28). 
59  Id. (from 57:40–57:44). 
60  Id. (from 1:00:20–1:01:14). 
61  Id. at (from 1:02:30–1:03:02). 
62  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 3.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). This article does 
not focus on the activities of Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. No judicial 
code of ethics applies to SCOTUS Justices, and no sitting SCOTUS Justice is on publicly 
available social media. Instead, this article focuses on the social media activities of other 
federal judges and of state judges. 
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“law-related pursuits and civic, charitable, educational, religious, social, finan-
cial, fiduciary, and governmental activities.”63 Judges can speak at a bar associ-
ation event or teach a law school course, and many do.64 Judges frequently 
speak at local civic events and school commencements. For example, D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals Judge Merrick Garland gave a speech to fifth graders 
graduating from J.O. Wilson Elementary School in Washington, D.C. in June 
2016.65 Justice Garland advised the 5th graders, “You be the brave one. Lead 
your friends in the right direction. Don’t let them make bad choices.”66 In May 
2018, Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye of the California Supreme Court 
gave the keynote address at the University of California at Davis School of 
Law.67 She advised graduates that “the privilege” of legal education is “to spot 
the issues, raise the narrative, and bring change in the name of equal justice for 
                                                        
63  See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 2A GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY Canon 4 
(Mar. 12, 2019). Canon 4 also provides that federal judges “may speak, write, lecture, and 
teach on both law-related and nonlegal subjects.” Id. 
64  See, e.g., Kimberly Reich, U.S. Federal Judge, Professor Teach Course Offering UVA 
Law Students Insight on Judicial Decisions, U. VA. SCH. L. (Jan. 13, 2015) (describing Judi-
cial Philosophy in Theory and Paractice course team-taught by now-Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Judge Amul Thapar and Professor Emeritus Lillian BeVier), https://www.law.virgin 
ia.edu/news/2015_spr/judicial-philosophy.htm [https://perma.cc/7Y8A-48ZT] (now-Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Amul Thapar co-taught a course); Judges, U.S. COURT 
APPEALS SIXTH CIRCUIT, https://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/judges (last visited Mar. 26, 2019); 
Annual Meeting Honorees, Speakers, Events, N.C. B. ASS’N, https://www.ncbar.org/news/an 
nual-meeting-honorees-and-speakers/ [https://perma.cc/VG29-LZDQ] (last visited Mar. 12, 
2019) (reporting that Judge Roger L. Gregory, Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, gave the keynote address at the North Carolina Bar Association’s annual meeting in 
June 2017); Course Listing for William A. Fletcher, BERKELEY L., https://www.law.berkeley. 
edu/php-programs/courses/facultyCourses.php?pID=5561 [https://perma.cc/TY3R-VC88] 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019) (explaining Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge William A. 
Fletcher teaches Federal Courts at Berkeley Law); Event Announcement: Supreme Court 
Preview in San Francisco, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 24, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/ 
10/event-announcement-supreme-court-preview-in-san-francisco/ [https://perma.cc/4YP6-Y 
XFQ] (sharing that Judge Marsha Berzon of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals spoke at a 
luncheon co-hosted by the Appellate Section of the Bar Association of San Francisco); Fire-
side Chat with Federal District Court Judge Jon Tigar, S. ASIAN B. ASS’N N. CAL., 
http://www.southasianbar.org/events/2018/11/14/fireside-chat-with-federal-district-court-
judge-jon-tigar [https://perma.cc/84ZZ-2339] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) (stating Judge Jon 
Tigar of the N. District of California spoke at a South Asian Bar Association of Northern 
California event in November 2018); Judges Who Teach, OHIO ST. U. MORITZ C.L., https://m 
oritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/judges-who-teach/ [https://perma.cc/QTU9-U22A] (last visited Mar. 
11, 2019) (listing federal and state judges slated to teach at The Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law in 2013-2014 school year). 
65  Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Nominee’s Advice to 5th-Graders: “Be the Brave One”, 
NPR (June 15, 2016, 4:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/15/482206242/merrick-garlan 
d-delivers-5th-grade-commencement-address [https://perma.cc/8SNN-ENXY]. 
66  Id. 
67  2018 Law School Keynote Speaker—Tani Cantil-Sakauye, AGGIE VIDEO, https://video.ucd 
avis.edu/media/2018+Law+School+Keynote+Speaker+-Tani+Cantil-Sakauye/0_gpjprww7 
[https://perma.cc/XQ3P-UHK8] (last visited, Mar. 12, 2019). 
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all.”68 Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor of the Ohio Supreme Court gave a 
speech at the American Bar Association’s 2018 Midyear House of Delegates 
Meeting.69 
Judicial conduct rules recognize the value of having judges engaged in the 
community. A Comment to the judicial ethics rules for federal judges cautions, 
“Complete separation of a judge from extrajudicial activities is neither possible 
nor wise; a judge should not become isolated from the society in which the 
judge lives.”70 
However, in engaging in extrajudicial activities, judges are expected to 
maintain impartiality and the dignity of their office. Impartiality is recognized 
as a fundamental and essential feature of the judicial system.71 Under the Code, 
a federal judge must take care to preserve the “dignity” of their office and to 
avoid activities that “interfere” with “official duties.”72 A federal judge should 
not participate in activities that “reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality” 
or “lead to frequent disqualification.”73 
The limitations on judges’ extrajudicial activities, for the sake of impartial-
ity, extend to the financial, political, and personal. They even encompass in 
some respects the judge’s family members. For example, a federal judge may 
serve as an officer, director, or employee of a business “only if the business is 
closely held and controlled by members of the judge’s family.”74 A federal 
judge must try to prevent any member of their family residing in the same 
household from soliciting or accepting a gift except to the extent that the judge 
                                                        
68  Id. (from 14:00–14:10). 
69  Maureen O’Connor, Chief Justice, American Bar Association 2018 Midyear House of 
Delegates Meeting (Feb. 5, 2018) (transcript available at the Supreme Court of Ohio 
Speeches Archives), https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/PIO/Speeches/2018/ABA.asp [http 
s://perma.cc/CA9N-W23J] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). The Ohio Supreme Court maintains 
a publicly accessible online archive of speeches given by its justices. See, e.g., 2018 Speech-
es, SUP. CT. OHIO & OHIO JUD. SYS., https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/PIO/Speeches/2018 
[https://perma.cc/RP82-92S9] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
70  Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 2A GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY Canon 4 cmt. 
(Mar. 12, 2019). The Comment continues,  
[A] judge is in a unique position to contribute to the law, the legal system, and the administration 
of justice . . . . To the extent that the judge’s time permits and impartiality is not compromised, 
the judge is encouraged to do so, either independently or through a bar association, judicial con-
ference, or other organization dedicated to the law.  
Id. 
71  Donald L. Burnett, Jr., A Cancer on the Republic: The Assault upon Impartiality of State 
Courts and the Challenge to Judicial Selection, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 265, 265 (2007) 
(“For more than two centuries, this republic has in all respects depended for its vitality upon 
the impartiality of an independent judiciary.”). Burnett wrote, “Judicial impartiality implies 
judicial objectivity and resides at the core of what Justice Kennedy memorably has called the 
‘promise’ of ‘neutrality.’ Impartiality is an imperative . . .” Id. at 271–72. 
72  Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 2A GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY Canon 4 (Mar. 
12, 2019). 
73  Id. 
74  Id. at Canon 4D(2). 
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would be permitted to do so.75 And a federal judge may not endorse or oppose a 
candidate for public office.76 
If a question of impartiality arises, a judge may have to disqualify them-
selves from presiding over a case.77 The Code of Judicial Conduct for federal 
judges and the ABA Model Rules of Judicial Conduct require a judge to dis-
qualify themselves from a proceeding if the judge’s impartiality “might reason-
ably be questioned.”78 The Code specifies that disqualification is required when 
“the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.”79 
II. BOTS AND BUBBLES 
But, in an era of bots and bubbles, have judicial ethics rules and opinions 
sufficiently accounted for the potential impact of these social media phenomena 
on impartiality? Consider the following: What if a judge on Facebook is ex-
posed every day to a “fake news” report shared by her adult child, who re-
ceived the report from a fake bot account, about the dangers of a medication, 
and the judge then presides over a suit brought by plaintiffs alleging they were 
victims of flaws in the warning labels of that medication? How can the Court 
determine if recusal is appropriate? Does it matter if the judge trusts her child? 
If the judge even recalls any details of the so-called news reports? If the judge 
saw images of persons’ injuries from the report but cannot remember the medi-
cation name? Under what circumstances should the judge disclose the social 
media exposure? Should the judge recuse herself? 
The answers to those questions may be different in this era of social media 
bots and bubbles than they were when, to receive news, people turned on the 
television to the nightly news or picked up the New York Times or their local 
city newspaper from their doorstep. Social media technology today allows for 
unprecedented amplification of persistent false information and speed of 
spreading of that information. Consumers of information and news, including 
judges, have never before been subject to that level of amplification and speed. 
Also, social media communications like retweets and likes on Twitter, unlike 
the instance of judges watching television or reading newspapers, are perma-
nent and accessible forever. 
                                                        
75  Id. 
76  See id. at Canon 5A(2); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.1(A)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2011). 
77  Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their Impartiality Might Reasonably 
Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 411, 429–30 (2014). 
78  Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 2A GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY Canon 3C(1) 
(Mar. 12, 2019); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); 
Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality 
“Might Reasonably Be Questioned”, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 70 (2000) (noting that, on 
a motion to recuse, there is a presumption of partiality). 
79  Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 2A GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY Canon 
3C(1)(a) (Mar. 12, 2019). 
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Following is a brief overview of the technology and impact of social media 
bots and bubbles. 
A. Social Media Bots80 
“Fake accounts, deployed by governments, criminals and entrepreneurs, now 
infest social media networks. By some calculations, as many as 48 million of 
Twitter’s reported active users—nearly 15 percent—are automated accounts 
designed to simulate real people . . .”—New York Times, Jan. 27, 201881 
The word bot comes from robot.82 Social media bots are automated soft-
ware programs that appear on social media and are usually not labeled as social 
media bots. They can easily be confused with human social media accounts.83 
Bots can “interact with humans and sometimes trick them into believing they 
are human.”84 Social media bots are “accounts controlled by software, algo-
rithmically generating content and establishing interactions.”85 Some bots oper-
ate on Twitter all day “reading far more tweets than any human possibly 
could.”86 “Some of them tweet their own messages on particular topics, some-
times mashing up tweets from other Twitter users.”87 Social bots that interact 
with humans are increasingly appearing on social media sites like Twitter and 
Facebook.88 Bots are getting better at mimicking human behavior; “for exam-
ple, they might be programmed to follow sleep-wake cycles to blend in with 
human users.”89 
Bots are common on social media. One study by University of Southern 
California and Indiana University researchers estimated that between 9 percent 
and 15 percent (potentially 48 million) of active Twitter accounts are bots.90 
                                                        
80  This article does not focus on a situation where lawyers may adopt pseudonyms or false 
personas on social media. Instances of lawyers, directly or indirectly, adopting false personas 
online, have previously been explored in the ethical context. See, e.g., John G. Browning, 
Keep Your “Friends” Close and Your Enemies Closer: Walking the Ethical Tightrope in the 
Use of Social Media, 3 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 204, 225, 228 (2013). 
81  Confessore et al., supra note 1. 
82  Tech Policy Lab at Univ. of Wash., What is a Bot?, YOUTUBE (Mar. 15, 2016), https://w 
ww.youtube.com/watch?v=UQLo399K3PE [https://perma.cc/8SWQ-MYMC]. 
83  Kai Kupferschmidt, Social Media “Bots” Tried to Influence the U.S. Election. Germany 
May Be Next, SCI. (Sept. 13, 2017, 3:45 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/09/soci 
al-media-bots-tried-influence-us-election-germany-may-be-next [https://perma.cc/R6BA-S4 
P7?type=image]. 
84  Tech Policy Lab at Univ. of Wash., supra note 82 (from 00:10–00:15). 
85  Varol et al., supra note 5, at 280. 
86  Tech Policy Lab at Univ. of Wash., supra note 82 (from 01:29–01:42). 
87  Id. 
88  Id. (from 03:42–03:53). 
89  Id. 
90  Varol et al., supra note 5, at 280; see Zoey Chong, Up to 48 Million Twitter Accounts Are 
Bots, Study Says, CNET (Mar. 14, 2017, 9:05 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/new-study-
says-almost-15-percent-of-twitter-accounts-are-bots/ [https://perma.cc/ZG9A-QWYN?type= 
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Bots can be divided into three categories: (1) scheduled bots that post mes-
sages based on time; (2) watcher bots that monitor other social media accounts 
and websites, and post when a change occurs (for example, one bot tweets in-
formation whenever the U.S. Geological Survey online posts provide new in-
formation about earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay Area); and (3) amplifica-
tion bots that share and “like” posts sent by the person who has bought that 
bot’s services.91 
Bots can perform seemingly beneficial functions like sharing a poem a day, 
disseminating news, and coordinating volunteer activities.92 However, mali-
cious bots have surfaced.93 Human social media users’ unwitting interactions 
with bots happen frequently, and those interactions can have consequences like 
the spread of “fake news” or the hacking of confidential information.94 Bots 
have played a role in creating fake grassroots political support, promoting ter-
rorist propaganda and recruitment, and manipulating the stock market.95 One 
study of bot activity found that on most days, more than half of the tweets post-
ed by accounts tweeting about Russian politics were produced by bots.96 Re-
searchers continue to study how to detect and identify bots.97 
Bots can also be relentless carriers of false information in critical areas like 
health. One study revealed how bots convinced consumers that using e-
cigarettes can help people stop their smoking habits notwithstanding that this 
assertion was not supported by science research.98 The lead researcher for that 
                                                                                                                                
image]. 
91  Confessore, et al., supra note 1. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  See Burkhardt, supra note 5 (“People who are unaware that they are interacting with a bot 
can easily be supplied with false information. According to research published in the Com-
munications of the Association for Computing Machinery in 2016, more than 20% of authen-
tic Facebook users accept friend requests indiscriminately. People with a large network of 
friends are more likely to accept requests from people they don’t know. This can make it rel-
atively easy for bots to infiltrate a network of social media users.”) (citation omitted); Mo-
hammad Shafahi et al., Phishing Through Social Bots on Twitter, 1 IEEE INT’L. CONF. ON 
BIG DATA (BIG DATA) 3703, 3705 (2016), https://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings/big-
data/2016/9005/00/07841038.pdf (Phishing, although “old,” remains a “serious threat”). 
95  Varol et al., supra note 5, at 280; see also A “Dirty and Open Secret”: Can Social Media 
Curb Fake Followers?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Feb. 2, 2018), http://knowledge.wharton.u 
penn.edu/article/twitter-and-the-bots/ [https://perma.cc/9XRG-R5RV]. 
96  Denis Stukal et al., Detecting Bots on Russian Political Twitter, 5 BIG DATA 310, 315 
(2017). 
97  See Mary Ann Liebert, Inc., How Great Is the Influence and Risk of Social and Political 
“Bots?”, PHYS.ORG (Dec. 19, 2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-12-great-social-political-
bots.html [https://perma.cc/L97W-8PT7]. 
98  Jon-Patrick Allem et al., E-Cigarette Surveillance with Social Media Data: Social Bots, 
Emerging Topics, and Trends, 3 JMIR PUB. HEALTH & SURVEILLANCE 1, 6 (2017); see Rob-
ert Glatter, Bot or Not? How Fake Social Media Accounts Can Jeopardize Your Health, 
FORBES (Dec. 23, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertglatter/2017/12/23/b 
ot-or-not-how-fake-social-media-accounts-can-jeopardize-your-health/ [https://perma.cc/5H 
LJ-FEQE]. 
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study warned that bots spreading false health claims “are designed to promote a 
specific, slanted narrative—24 hours a day, seven days a week . . . . Social bots 
can pass on health advice that hasn’t been scientifically proven . . . . Bottom 
line: Online falsehoods can influence offline behavior.”99 Researchers recom-
mend that public health campaigns be designed to counteract the impact of bots 
encouraging unhealthy behaviors.100 
Legislators have introduced bills aimed at curbing the unwanted negative 
impacts of bots, including requiring social media bots to be identified as bots to 
social media users.101 So far, a few efforts have succeeded, most notably with 
California’s new social media bot law and in the area of ticket sales bots. In 
September 2018, California adopted a law on “bots,” requiring anyone using a 
bot online, including on a social network, to disclose that they are using a 
bot.102 The federal Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, known as the BOTS 
Act, outlaws the use of bots to circumvent measures put in place to “enforce 
posted event ticket purchasing limits or to maintain the integrity of posted 
online ticket purchasing order rules[.]”103 The stated purpose of the Act is “[t]o 
prohibit the circumvention of control measures used by Internet ticket sellers to 
ensure equitable consumer access to tickets for any given event, and for other 
purposes.”104 As Madeline Lamo at the University of Washington wrote, bills 
purportedly regulating the use of bots “are designed to respond to serious, well-
founded concerns about the use of social media bots to spread misinformation 
and sow discord online, most infamously during the 2016 election season.”105 
                                                        
99  Glatter, supra note 98. 
100  Id. 
101  In 2018, Senator Diane Feinstein introduced the Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act 
of 2018. S. 3127, 115th Cong. (2018). See Madeline Lamo, Regulating Bots on Social Media 
Is Easier Said Than Done, SLATE (Aug. 9, 2018, 9:07 AM), https://slate.com/technology/201 
8/08/to-regulate-bots-we-have-to-define-them.html [https://perma.cc/ED27-V2WW]. 
102  Approved by California Governor Jerry Brown in September 2018 and operative on July 
1, 2019, the new statute provides, in part, 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to use a bot to communicate or interact with another per-
son in California online, with the intent to mislead the other person about its artificial identity for 
the purpose of knowingly deceiving the person about the content of the communication in order 
to incentivize a purchase or sale of goods or services in a commercial transaction or to influence 
a vote in an election. A person using a bot shall not be liable under this section if the person dis-
closes that it is a bot. 
(b) The disclosure required by this section shall be clear, conspicuous, and reasonably designed 
to inform persons with whom the bot communicates or interacts that it is a bot. 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17941 (West 2019). 
The new code chapter defines bot as “an automated online account where all or substantially 
all of the actions or posts of that account are not the result of a person” and online as “ap-
pearing on any public-facing Internet Web site, Web application, or digital application, in-
cluding a social network or publication.” Id. § 17940. 
103  BOTS Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, 130 Stat. 1401 (2016) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45c). 
104  Id. 
105  Lamo, supra note 101. 
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However, as Lamo noted, attempted regulation of bots is not without defini-
tional, technical, logistical, and constitutional complications.106 
Awareness of social media bots appears to vary depending on age and edu-
cation. A recent Pew research study found that younger Americans ages eight-
een through forty-nine are more likely than older adults ages fifty and older to 
have heard about social media bots.107 The same study found that about three-
quarters of Americans with a college degree were aware of social media 
bots.108 
Ultimately, bots can do a lot of good, but they can have profoundly harm-
ful uses and impacts that are not about to be reduced in any significant way in 
the near future. 
B. Social Media Bubbles 
“(I)f people are sorting themselves into communities of like-minded types, their 
own freedom is at risk. They are living in a prison of their own design”—
Professor Cass Sunstein, on social media users109 
Social media companies help people live in a customized social media 
world, a bubble, that accounts for their personal preferences. “Bubbles” refer to 
virtual information universes made by users or algorithms or both, unwittingly 
or not. Social media companies use algorithms to customize a social media us-
er’s experience.110 “Filter bubble,” a term that was coined by Eli Pariser in 
2010, refers to the online ecosystem produced by algorithmic filtering.111 In fil-
ter bubbles, algorithms select content for a social media user’s viewing accord-
ing to that user’s previous online behavior.112 Some have argued that filter bub-
bles, through their relentless personalization based on people’s behavior in the 
                                                        
106  Id. 
107  GALEN STOCKING & NAMI SUMIDA, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA BOTS DRAW 
PUBLIC’S ATTENTION AND CONCERN 5 (2018), http://www.journalism.org/wp-content/uploads 
/sites/8/2018/10/PJ_2018.10.15_social-media-bots_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H2Q-LXZ 
B]. 
108  Id. 
109  SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 12. 
110  The Daily Dish, The Filter Bubble, ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.co 
m/daily-dish/archive/2010/10/the-filter-bubble/181427/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ2Q-7VVV]. 
Explaining how complex algorithms work, and the varied ways in which they can work, is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
111  Id. (defining filter bubble); see also Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank, The Echo Cham-
ber is Overstated: The Moderating Effect of Political Interest and Diverse Media, 21 INFO., 
COMM. & SOC’Y 729, 731 (2018); Seth R. Flaxman et al., Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, 
and Online News Consumption, 80 PUB. OPINION Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 298, 299 (2016); Filter 
Bubble, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/filter%20bubble 
[https://perma.cc/YDM7-ESLS] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
112  Bakshy et al., supra note 8, at 1130. 
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virtual world (and beyond), exacerbate a tendency for people to select media 
and content that reinforce their existing preferences.113 
Social media platforms give rise to the possibility of virtual echo chambers, 
a kind of bubble created by a social media user’s own source selections, or a 
combination of algorithmic filtering and the user’s selections.114 The use of 
“echo chamber” in reference to politics “is a metaphorical way to describe a 
situation where only certain ideas, information and beliefs are shared.”115 In an 
echo chamber, people will “encounter things they already agree with.”116 
“Without free movement of ideas and information people inside the echo 
chamber will believe that this is all there is.”117 Some worry that an “echo 
chamber” environment could facilitate “social extremism and political polariza-
tion.”118 
Still, a study conducted by Facebook in collaboration with the School of 
Information at the University of Michigan emphasized that, more than bubbles 
created by algorithms, individuals’ choices determine exposure to “attitude-
challenging information.”119 Those researchers, some of whom were from Fa-
cebook, concluded, “our work suggests that the power to expose oneself to per-
spectives from the other side in social media lies first and foremost with indi-
viduals.”120 
And not everyone agrees that echo chambers are prevalent. In 2017, Du-
bois and Blank summarized the state of the research on the very existence of 
echo chambers, 
                                                        
113  Dubois & Blank, supra note 111, at 731 (“The filter bubble argument suggests algorith-
mic filtering which personalizes content presented on social media and, through use of 
search engines, could exacerbate the tendency for people to select media and content which 
reinforce their existing preferences.”) (citing PARISER, supra note 8). Interestingly, in one 
study of potential filter bubbles arising from algorithmic recommender systems, researchers 
saw “evidence that users who actually consume the items recommended to them experience 
lessened narrowing effects and rate items more positively.” Tien T. Nguyen et al., Exploring 
the Filter Bubble: The Effect of Using Recommender Systems on Content Diversity, 2014 
WWW PROCEEDINGS 677, http://wwwconference.org/proceedings/www2014/proceedings/p6 
77.pdf. 
114  Flaxman et al., supra note 111, at 299. 
115  Dubois & Blank, supra note 111, at 729 (citing to KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & JOSEPH 
N. CAPPELLA, ECHO CHAMBER: RUSH LIMBAUGH AND THE CONSERVATIVE MEDIA 
ESTABLISHMENT (2008) and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2009)). 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  Pablo Barberá et al., Tweeting From Left to Right: Is Online Political Communication 
More than an Echo Chamber?, 26 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1531, 1531 (2015) (“[T]o the extent that 
individuals expose themselves to information that simply reinforces their existing views, 
greater access to information may foster selective exposure to ideologically congenial con-
tent, resulting in an ‘echo chamber’ environment that could facilitate social extremism and 
political polarization.”) (citations omitted). 
119  Bakshy et al., supra note 8, at 1130. 
120  Id. at 1132. 
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Examinations of selective exposure have shown that individuals do tend to ex-
pose themselves to information and ideas they agree with more often but they do 
not tend to avoid information and ideas which are conflicting. Even among par-
tisans in the US, the media diet of Republicans and Democrats is in fact quite 
similar. While some have found evidence of echo chambers on Twitter, others 
have shown that the trend does not persist on Facebook.121 
The impact of automation and opaque algorithmic filtering on people’s be-
haviors and beliefs is not known with a great degree of certainty. On social me-
dia, “Individuals may be exposed to information and perspectives which are al-
so diverse or they may select varied media in a way that produces the echo 
chamber effect.”122 Evidence “has been conflicting.”123 Some conclude that so-
cial media has played a smaller role in political polarization than had been pre-
dicted or feared during the beginning years of social media.124 Some studies 
have focused on the possibility that people elect to read only or mostly news 
that reflects their interests, opinions, and beliefs—that they live in “echo cham-
bers” on social media.125 
Cass Sunstein’s prominent critique of social media customization asks that 
social media platforms like Facebook exercise restraint in limiting the news 
people see: 
[I]f people are sorting themselves into communities of like-minded types, their 
own freedom is at risk. They are living in a prison of their own design. 
. . . 
Facebook seems to think that it would be liberating if every person’s News Feed 
could be personalized so that people see only and exactly what they want. Don’t 
believe it.126 
Sunstein describes social media customization as an “architecture of con-
trol” facilitating a situation where “birds of a feather can easily flock togeth-
                                                        
121  Dubois & Blank, supra note 111, at 730 (citations omitted). 
122  Id. 
123  Id.; Barberá et al., supra note 118, at 1532 (“The extent to which citizens exhibit patterns 
of ideological polarization in online exchanges remains an open debate. Some researchers 
have reported high levels of clustering along party lines, characterizing social-media plat-
forms as echo chambers, whereas others have found that ideological segregation online is 
low in absolute terms—with open cross-ideological exchanges and exposure to ideological 
diversity being fairly common. One possible explanation for the variability in results is that 
some studies have relied on self-selected samples of partisan individuals, whereas others 
have not.”) (citations omitted). 
124  Dubois & Blank, supra note 111, at 740. 
125  Id. at 730; see also R. Kelly Garrett, Echo Chambers Online?: Politically Motivated Se-
lective Exposure among Internet News Users, 14 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 265, 267 
(2009); Shanto Iyengar & Kyu S. Hahn, Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological 
Selectivity in Media Use, 59 J. COMM. 19, 24–25 (2009). 
126  SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 12–16 (“In the 2016 presidential election, the News Feed 
spread a lot of falsehoods . . . . But in view of its massive role in determining what kinds of 
news people see, it is far from ideal if it does not include, among its core values, promoting 
or at least not undermining democratic self-government. Facebook can do better.”). 
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er.”127 He argues, “for the sake of” “democracy itself,” for an “architecture of 
serendipity” on social media to replace the “architecture of control”: 
My largest plea here . . . is for an architecture of serendipity—for the sake of in-
dividual lives, group behavior, innovation, and democracy itself . . . . An archi-
tecture of serendipity counteracts homophily, and promotes both self-
government and individual liberty.128 
However, while researchers agree that social media platforms feature much 
polarization, the net effect on political participation and other behaviors may be 
less than previously feared or assumed.129 In recent research, Dubois and Blank 
note that “evidence-based studies of echo chambers have mostly been based on 
studies of political polarization in social media, especially Twitter.”130 They de-
scribe “a typical paper [that] applies network methods to data from the US to 
show that Democrats’ and Republicans’ Twitter networks are mostly sepa-
rate.”131 
Dubois and Blank conclude that when available diverse media, and not 
solely social media, are taken into account, “there is little apparent echo cham-
ber.”132 So, even if one study that looks only at Twitter finds evidence of echo 
chambers and political polarization, that study does not necessarily inform 
whether or not a given user operates in an echo chamber. That study may not 
have taken into account other sources that a user may access, such as in-person 
conversations, newspapers, and magazines. Dubois and Blank urge others to 
study “the entire media environment” and not solely one social media platform 
or solely social media.133 They conclude, “Whatever may be happening on any 
single social media platform, when we look at the entire media environment, 
there is little apparent echo chamber.”134 
Another group of researchers have found a higher growth in polarization 
among demographic groups least likely to use the internet and social media and 
note that their finding is inconsistent with a hypothesis that social media is a 
primary driver of political polarization.135 One group of researchers found that 
political polarization rose significantly more among the older-than-seventy-five 
                                                        
127  Id. at 2. 
128  Id. at 4–5. 
129  Dubois & Blank, supra note 111, at 741 (“It seems likely that networks on Twitter are 
polarized, as Conover et al.’s results show, and networks on other social media may be 
equally polarized. But social media are only part of the environment, and they are the least 
trusted part.”) (citing M.D. Conover, Political Polarization on Twitter, 5 INT’L AAAI CONF. 
ON WEBLOGS & SOCIAL MEDIA 89–96 (2011)). 
130  Id. at 732. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 740. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. 
135  Levi Boxell et al., Is the Internet Causing Political Polarization? Evidence from De-
mographics 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23258, 2017), https://w 
ww.nber.org/papers/w23258.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTN7-2UHC]. 
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demographic than for those ages eighteen through thirty-nine.136 In 2012, less 
than 20 percent of the over-seventy-five population used social media, while 80 
percent of the eighteen through thirty-nine demographic group used social me-
dia.137 
One study’s authors, including Facebook researchers, claim that the Face-
book platform leaves “substantial room for exposure to opposing view-
points.”138 That study, by Facebook researchers collaborating with the School 
of Information at the University of Michigan, found that, on average, more than 
20 percent of a Facebook user’s “friends who report any ideological affiliation 
are from an opposing party.”139 The study’s authors however do not dispute 
that “partisans tend to maintain relationships with like-minded contacts.”140 
A recent study involving 3.8 million Twitter users concluded that “ideolog-
ical segregation” on social media may have been overestimated.141 The Twitter 
study researchers concluded, “[t]he popularization of social media as a means 
of communication within interpersonal networks is not inevitably bounded by 
ideological contours, especially when it comes to nonpolitical issues and 
events.”142 In that study, researchers analyzed “big data” sources to explore the 
extent “to which the online media environment resembles an echo chamber 
characterized by selective exposure, ideological segregation, and political po-
larization or a ‘national conversation’ in which individuals of differing ideolog-
ical persuasions read and retweet one another’s messages.”143 
The degree of “ideological segregation” could depend on topics being dis-
cussed. The researchers in the Twitter study found that discussions of the 2012 
election, the 2013 government shutdown, and the 2014 State of the Union Ad-
dress resembled an echo chamber.144 “Information about these events was ex-
changed primarily among individuals with highly similar ideological prefer-
ences.”145 They found “liberals tended to retweet tweets from other liberals, 
and conservatives were especially likely to retweet tweets from other conserva-
tives.”146 However, retweets about nonpolitical topics like the Boston Marathon 
bombing, the 2014 Super Bowl, and the 2014 Winter Olympics all crossed ide-
ological boundaries.147 Researchers found, for example, that liberals and con-
                                                        
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  Bakshy et al., supra note 8, at 1131. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Barberá et al., supra note 118, at 1532. 
142  Id. at 1540. 
143  Id. at 1532. 
144  Id. at 1533. 
145  Id. at 1539. 
146  Id. at 1537. 
147  Id. 
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servatives “interacted with each other to a considerable degree” concerning the 
Super Bowl.148 
Timing can affect polarization. Researchers have found a pattern in social 
media responses to a specific event like a mass shooting at an elementary 
school.149 After such a tragic event, social media posts start a “national conver-
sation,” and then shift to echo chambers.150 
In summary, the research on the impact of algorithmic filtering is ongoing. 
Some studies cited here were based on data drawn from the early years of so-
cial media, when algorithms were fewer and therefore social media users prob-
ably controlled more of what they saw and with whom they engaged. As tech-
nology evolves, the research may yet reveal greater pernicious effects of the 
algorithmic filtering as well as more enlightened, informed measures to combat 
those effects. 
C. Addressing Malicious Effects 
Social media companies only recently started stepping up efforts to filter 
out fake accounts, and only “after revelations that Russia-aligned hackers had 
deployed networks of Twitter bots to spread divisive content and junk news 
. . . .”151 They have announced various measures to combat “malicious automa-
tion.”152 Social media researchers meanwhile have made efforts to detect bots 
with simple filter tools.153 
Also, lawmakers have begun investigating the proliferation of automated 
accounts on social media platforms, and some announcements by social media 
companies to combat problematic accounts have followed.154 With pressure 
from lawmakers, journalists, and users, several social media companies have 
gradually acknowledged the existence of attempts to manipulate conversations 
                                                        
148  Id. 
149  Id. at 1536–37. 
150  Id. at 1537 (“[W]e found that Twitter responses to some specific events—such as the 
tragic elementary-school shooting in Newtown, Connecticut—exhibited a dynamic shift 
from national conversation to echo chamber . . . . [T]he level of polarization increased over 
time, as the conversation shifted from the tragedy to a debate over gun-control policy.”). 
151  Confessore et al., supra note 1; see also Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, 
Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1637 (2018) (ex-
ploring how social media platforms like Facebook are moderating online speech). 
152  Yoel Roth & Del Harvey, How Twitter is Fighting Spam and Malicious Automation, 
TWITTER BLOG (June 26, 2018), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018 
/how-twitter-is-fighting-spam-and-malicious-automation.html [https://perma.cc/Y5J5-C79Z 
]; see also Confessore et al., supra note 1 (quoting a Twitter spokesperson who said, “[w]e 
continue to fight hard to tackle any malicious automation on our platform as well as false or 
spam accounts.”). 
153  Barberá et al., supra note 118, at 1534 (“We also applied simple activity, location, and 
spam filters . . . . to try to ensure that all Twitter users included in our analysis corresponded 
to actual citizens.”). 
154  Confessore et al., supra note 1. 
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through “[i]nauthentic accounts, spam, and malicious automation” and have 
announced action to combat the attempts.155 For example, Twitter announced in 
June 2018 that it would require new account registrants to confirm an email ad-
dress or phone number when registering for Twitter.156 Twitter disclosed that it 
“fights spam and malicious automation” and that its “focus is increasingly on 
proactively identifying problematic accounts and behavior . . . .”157 They 
claimed they were focused “on developing machine learning tools that identify 
and take action on networks of spammy or automated accounts automatical-
ly.”158 
III. JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
Awareness, or at least publicity, of the ethical implications of judges as so-
cial media users is on the rise, but little has been written on the possibility of 
judges navigating social media amidst bots and algorithmic bubbles.159 The 
awareness of state and federal judges on social media about the presence of so-
cial media bots and bubbles appears not to be documented or known.160 
However, much attention has been devoted to the judicial ethics of social 
media on several other fronts. Two successive issues of the Judicial Conduct 
Reporter, a publication of the National Center for State Courts Center for Judi-
cial Ethics, were devoted to the topic of “Social media and judicial ethics.”161 
                                                        
155  Roth & Harvey, supra note 153; see also Confessore et al., supra note 1 (quoting a Twit-
ter spokesperson who said, “[w]e continue to fight hard to tackle any malicious automation 
on our platform as well as false or spam accounts.”). 
156  Roth & Harvey, supra note 153. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. 
159  This excerpt from the Report of the Conference of Court Public Information Officers, for 
example, references the use of fake Twitter accounts in the specific context of pro-China 
tweets, thus acknowledging the presence of bots on social media but not directly linking 
their presence to judicial ethics: 
Using social media to persuade has its risks. In an apparently state-backed effort, pro-China 
tweets peppered Tibetans and the surrounding region recently with at least 100 identified fake 
Twitter accounts, all aimed at presenting upbeat news about China and even Tibetans’ “deep ap-
preciation for China’s governance of the region.” But the effort was hardly veiled, as the fake 
account profile photos, as well as those images and videos tweeted all featured Caucasian indi-
viduals whose photos were common to Western stock-photography companies. 
CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS, supra note 35, at 2. 
160  As mentioned earlier, a 2018 Pew research study found that older Americans ages fifty 
and older were less likely than younger Americans, ages eighteen to forty-nine, to be aware 
of social media bots. STOCKING & SUMIDA, supra note 107, at 5. While Article III judges’ 
average age is well above fifty, the same study found that 78 percent of Americans with a 
college degree are aware of social media bots. Id.; Demography of Article III Judges, 1789-
2017, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/age-and-experie 
nce-judges [https://perma.cc/U7ZN-R5V8] (last visited on Mar. 13, 2019). 
161  See generally Gray, supra note 24; Cynthia Gray, Social Media and Judicial Ethics: Part 
2, 39 JUD. CONDUCT REP. 2, 2 (2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Cente 
r%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/JCR/JCR_Summer_2017.ashx [https://perma.cc/SFY6-RJ8 
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The U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct issued an advi-
sory opinion on judges’ use of electronic media, noting: 
The use of social media by judges and judicial employees raises several ethical 
considerations, including: (1) confidentiality; (2) avoiding impropriety in all 
conduct; (3) not lending the prestige of the office; (4) not detracting from the 
dignity of the court or reflecting adversely on the court; (5) not demonstrating 
special access to the court or favoritism; (6) not commenting on pending mat-
ters; (7) remaining within restrictions on fundraising; (8) not engaging in prohib-
ited political activity; and (9) avoiding association with certain social issues that 
may be litigated or with organizations that frequently litigate.162 
In Florida, judges can consult the Judicial Ethics Benchguide: Answers to Fre-
quently Asked Questions.163 One of the frequently asked questions is: “May 
Judge, Judicial Assistant, or Judicial Candidate Participate in Social Network-
ing Websites?”164 Facebook is listed in the Florida benchguide no fewer than 
eleven times.165 
As mentioned earlier, the decision to disqualify a judge from a case be-
cause “impartiality might be reasonably questioned” falls to the judge her-
self.166 Interestingly, judges are somewhat split on whether or not they can use 
social media without compromising ethics. In a survey, 65 percent of judges 
surveyed agreed with the statement that judges can use social media without 
compromising ethics.167 No data was located identifying what percentage of 
judges on social media are aware of the presence and impact of social media 
bots and bubbles. 
Many have explored the judicial ethics implications of judges on social 
media, pointing out the lack of guidance in ethical rules and urging a variety of 
approaches.168 Most fall on the side of current limitations being sufficient. 
                                                                                                                                
H]. 
162  Published Advisory Opinions, 2B GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 220, at 221 (Dec. 6, 
2018). 
163  See generally FLA. COURT EDUC. COUNCIL’S PUBL’N COMM., JUDICIAL ETHICS 
BENCHGUIDE: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2018), http://www.flcourts.org/ 
core/fileparse.php/304/urlt/JudicialEthicsBenchguide.pdf. 
164  Id. at 11. 
165  Id. at 11–13, 111. 
166  Id. at 167. 
167  CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS, supra note 35, at 27. 
168  See John G. Browning, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Judges’ Use of Social Media, 68 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 487, 533 (2014) (“Isolating judges from something viewed as so vital by 
much of the community is hardly desirable, as is depriving judges of technological 
knowledge (or at least familiarity) that can inform their handling of cases.”); Craig 
Estlinbaum, Social Networking and Judicial Ethics, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & 
ETHICS 2, 28 (2012) (“The next step is for state judicial committees to draft guidance that 
incorporate the reality of a judiciary that is fully engaged in the Social Media Age.”); M. Sue 
Kurita, Electronic Social Media: Friend or Foe for Judges, 7 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 184, 184 (2017) (provides some guidance for judges’ ethical use of 
social media); Nathanael J. Mitchell, Note, Judge 2.0: A New Approach to Judicial Ethics in 
the Age of Social Media, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 2127, 2158 (2012) (suggesting approaches to 
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Those limitations include restrictions on ex parte communications, the obliga-
tion to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary, and the 
prohibition against forming relationships that convey an impression that per-
sons are in a position to influence the judge. All of those limitations apply to 
judges, whether or not they are on social media. Judges may not initiate or 
permit ex parte communications concerning a pending matter.169 Likewise, a 
lawyer “shall not . . . seek to influence a judge . . . by means prohibited by law” 
or “communicate ex parte with [a judge] . . . unless authorized . . . by court or-
der.”170 
Judicial ethics opinions have applied the requirement of judicial impartiali-
ty to judges’ social media use. A judge shall act in a “manner that promotes 
public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judici-
ary.”171 The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity invoked this requirement in discussing judicial ethics and social media: “For 
example, while sharing comments, photographs, and other information, a judge 
must keep in mind the requirements of Rule 1.2 that call upon the judge to act 
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary, as previously dis-
cussed.”172 A judge shall avoid “impropriety and the appearance of improprie-
ty.”173 A judge shall not form relationships with persons that would convey an 
impression that they are in a position to influence the judge.174 The ABA Stand-
ing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, in its opinion about 
judges on social media, noted, “The judge should not form relationships with 
persons or organizations that may violate Rule 2.4(C) by conveying an impres-
sion that these persons or organizations are in a position to influence the 
judge.”175 
Many ethics committees and state bar courts have issued stern statements 
reminding judges that limitations on their extrajudicial activities apply to virtu-
al and in-real-life activities alike.176 Those limitations include impartiality. The 
                                                                                                                                
“ameliorate the negative effects of social media”); Shaziah Singh, Note, Friend Request De-
nied: Judicial Ethics and Social Media, 7 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 153, 171 
(2016) (provides guidance “about what constitutes an appropriate presence on social me-
dia”); Mark C. Palmer, Can Lawyers and Judges Be Social Media Friends?, ATT’Y WORK 
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.attorneyatwork.com/lawyers-judges-social-media/ [http://perma 
.cc/8J9R-AN9K]. 
169  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.9(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
170  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
171  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
172  ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462, at 2 (2013). 
173  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
174  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.4(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
175  ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462, at 2 (2013). 
176  Many ethics committees have provided guidance for lawyers on social media, but this 
article focuses primarily on such committees’ guidance for judges on social media, except 
when the guidance for lawyers discusses judicial conduct. See, e.g., D.C. Bar, Ethics Opin-
ion 371 on Social Media II: Use of Social Media in Providing Legal Services (Nov. 2016), 
https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/Ethics-Opinion-371.cfm [https://p 
19 NEV. L.J. 789, LEE 5/28/2019  11:01 AM 
Spring 2019] YOUR HONOR, ON SOCIAL MEDIA 815 
 
West Virginia code of judicial conduct includes a comment that emphasizes: 
“The same Rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct that govern a judicial of-
ficer’s ability to socialize and communicate in person, on paper, or over the tel-
ephone also apply to the Internet and social networking sites like Facebook.”177 
A New Mexico judge cautioned, judges must keep in mind that the code of ju-
dicial conduct applies “with equal force to virtual actions and online com-
ments.”178 The Preamble to the New Mexico Code of Judicial Conduct encour-
aged judges “to pay extra attention to issues surrounding emerging technology, 
including those regarding social media, and are urged to exercise extreme cau-
tion in its use so as not to violate the Code.”179 In a New York state commis-
sion on judicial conduct opinion, the commission noted that rules of judicial 
conduct apply “in cyberspace as well as to more traditional forms of communi-
cations . . .”180 
The courts’ and ethics committees’ approaches to judges’ use of social me-
dia have been categorized as either permissive or restrictive. Restrictive ap-
proaches are described as those that forbid the use of social media entirely or 
forbid at least any social media contact between a judge and a lawyer who may 
potentially appear before the judge.181 
                                                                                                                                
erma.cc/FY4W-SF54] (“The ABA and several ethics opinions have opined that judges can 
participate in social media, and a lawyer can be a ‘friend’ of judges on social media sites, as 
long as the contacts comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct; do not undermine the judges’ 
independence, integrity, or impartiality; and do not create an appearance of impropriety.”) 
Also, many bar journals have provided tips for lawyers for social media behavior that are not 
the focus of this article. See, e.g., Melissa Lessell, Is Being Friends with a Judge on Social 
Media an #Ethicsfail?, ABA (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_la 
wyers/publications/tyl/topics/ethics/is_being_friends_a_judge_social_media_ethicsfail/ 
[https://perma.cc/8NDV-JTFQ]; Dave Stafford, Lawyer Do’s and Don’ts on Social Media, 
IND. LAW. (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/37915-lawyer-dos-an 
d-donts-on-social-media [https://perma.cc/Q8KM-RR2J]. 
177  W. VA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 3.1, cmt. 6; see also Mo. Comm’n on Ret., Removal 
and Discipline, Advisory Op. 186 (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/ 
Topics/Center%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/MOAdvisoryOpinionReSocialMedia.ashx; 
N.M. Advisory Comm. on the Code of Judicial Conduct, Advisory Op. Concerning Social 
Media (Feb. 15, 2016), available at http://jec.unm.edu/manuals-resources/advisory-opinions/ 
Advisory_Opinion_Social_Media.pdf; Utah Courts, Informal Advisory Op. 12-01, at 4–5 
(Aug. 31, 2012), available at https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/ethadv/ethics_opinions/20 
12/12-1.pdf. 
178  State v. Thomas, 376 P.3d 184, 198 (N.M. 2016). 
179  N.M. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, r. 21-001. 
180  N.Y. STATE COMMISSION ON JUD. CONDUCT, ANNUAL REPORT 2017 app. F, at 274 (2017). 
181  Kurita, supra note 168, at 202–04. In an example of a restrictive approach, a Florida eth-
ics opinion in 2009 provided that a judge may not add “friends” on social media lawyers 
who may appear before the judge. Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op., No. 
2009-20 (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/ 
opinions/jeacopinions/2009/2009-20.html. However, in 2018, the Florida Supreme Court 
held in an unpublished opinion that the allegation that “a trial judge is a Facebook ‘friend’ 
with an attorney appearing before the judge, standing alone, does not constitute a legally suf-
ficient basis for disqualification.” Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein, P.A. v. United Servs. 
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Permissive approaches allow judges to maintain a presence and contacts on 
social media, with the same limitations and judgment the judge is required to 
exercise in other community engagement beyond social media—like, com-
mencement speeches.182 For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s discipli-
nary board issued an advisory opinion in 2010 permitting social media use but 
with caution: 
A judge may be a ‘friend’ on a social networking site with a lawyer who appears 
as counsel in a case before the judge. As with any other action a judge takes, a 
judge’s participation on a social networking site must be done carefully in order 
to comply with the ethical rules in the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct.183 
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility is-
sued an opinion favorably comparing judges’ social media use with the use of 
the U.S. mail and the telephone: 
Judicious use of ESM [or electronic social media] can benefit judges in both 
their personal and professional lives. As their use of this technology increases, 
judges can take advantage of its utility and potential as a valuable tool for public 
outreach. When used with proper care, judges’ use of ESM does not necessarily 
compromise their duties under the Model Code any more than use of traditional 
and less public forms of social connection such as U.S. Mail, telephone, email or 
texting.184 
The Committee pronounced that, because of the “open and casual nature” of 
social media communication, “a judge will seldom have an affirmative duty to 
disclose an ESM connection.”185 When a judge knows that a lawyer appearing 
before the judge has a social media connection to them, the Committee de-
clared, “[t]he judge should conduct the same analysis that must be made when-
ever matters before the court involve persons the judge knows or has a connec-
tion with professionally or personally.”186 
Judges have been reprimanded for ex parte communications and improprie-
ty on social media.187 Behaviors that have drawn reprimand or warning include 
                                                                                                                                
Auto. Ass’n, No. SC17-1848, 2018 WL 5994243, at *1 (Fla. 2018); see also Jim Saunders, 
Judges and Lawyers Can Be Facebook ‘Friends,’ Florida’s Top Court Decides, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (Nov. 15, 2018, 6:55 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/florida/os-ne-ju 
dges-lawyers-facebook-20181115-story.html [https://perma.cc/S8AK-EHLX?type=image]. 
182  Kurita, supra note 168, at 204–06. 
183  Sup. Ct. of Ohio, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. No. 2010-7 (Dec. 
3, 2010), available at http://www.ohioadvop.org/wp-contents/uploads/2017/04/Op_10-007. 
pdf. 
184  ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462, at 4 (2013). 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
187  Other judges, while not reprimanded by a judicial ethics body, have drawn public con-
demnation for social media postings. See, e.g., Emily Nitcher, Outspoken Nebraska Judge 
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a judge exchanging sexually explicit messages on Facebook with a person who 
appeared before that judge in court.188 Another judge had a publicly available 
MySpace page which listed the judge’s mood as “amorous.”189 One judge listed 
their interests on MySpace as: “[B]reaking my foot off in a prosecutor’s ass, 
anything relating to the NFL, video games, sex[,] and improving my ability to 
break my foot off in a prosecutor’s ass.”190 The North Carolina Judicial Stand-
ards Commission reprimanded a judge for “friending” a lawyer in a hearing be-
fore that judge and using a social media platform to discuss the case with the 
lawyer.191 “The commission found that the ex parte communications indicated 
a disregard of the principles of judicial conduct and constituted conduct preju-
dicial to the administration of justice.”192 
A recent Ninth Circuit opinion described the situation of a judge following 
on social media the prosecutor in a case before that judge and posting tweets 
related to that case: “[T]his case is a cautionary tale about the possible pitfalls 
of judges engaging in social media activity relating to pending cases, and we 
reiterate the importance of maintaining the appearance of propriety both on and 
off the bench.”193 In June 2018, in that case, the U.S. Supreme Court declined 
without comment to decide whether or not the judge should have recused him-
self.194 The U.S. Department of Justice had argued, “A district court’s ‘follow-
ing’ such an account does not generate an appearance of bias any more than 
watching the office’s press conferences on television or reading about the of-
fice’s activities in the newspaper.”195 The DOJ shared its view that the issue 
“would benefit from further development in the lower courts.”196 
Thus, although judicial ethics standards and opinions have confirmed that 
the requirement of judicial impartiality extends to social media activity, they 
have not yet squarely addressed potential dangers to judicial impartiality posed 
by bots and bubbles. 
                                                        
188  Kurita, supra note 168, at 223–24. 
189  Id. at 224. 
190  Id. (alterations in original). 
191  See Suzanne Lever, Pssst. Hey Judge . . . , 17 N.C. ST. B.J. 32, 35 (2012) (citing N.C. 
Jud. Standards Comm., Inquiry No. 08-234 (2009)). 
192  Id. 
193  United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 862 F.3d 1157, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2675 (2018). 
194  Marcia Coyle, #Denied: US Supreme Court Won’t Touch Dispute Over Tweeting Feder-
al Judge, RECORDER (June 25, 2018, 12:34 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2018/06/ 
25/denied-supreme-court-wont-touch-dispute-over-tweeting-federal-judge/ [https://perma.cc/ 
K6XS-PYWF]. 
195  Brief for the United States in Opposition at 17, Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 
862 F.3d 1157 (No. 17-1153), 2018 WL 2357729, at *27. 
196  Id. at *28. 
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IV. REDUCING RISKS TO JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 
Despite the persistent presence of malicious bots and social media bubbles, 
judges can still ethically engage on social media, with extreme caution and 
acute awareness of the evolving technologies. As explained below, risks that 
judges might fall prey to falsehoods on social media that compromise impar-
tiality may be minimized by several factors. Also, judges should be hyper-
vigilant and can take specific precautions. As long as bots and bubbles poten-
tially threaten judges’ ability to be independent and impartial, scholars, judges, 
and judicial ethics committees should continue to ask if ethical standards 
should be modified to account for the risks posed by bots and bubbles. 
A. Possibly Risk-Minimizing Forces 
1.  Low Level of Trust in Social Media as a News Source 
Although bots and bubbles exist and have enabled malicious and criminal 
social media use, some research suggests that the potential for social media 
playing a pivotal role in shaping the views of users, including judges, may be 
minimal. More than a billion people are on Facebook, and everyone can get 
news on Facebook and other leading social media platforms. However, some 
research suggests that relatively few people rely only on social media for news, 
and people do not have a high level of trust in the news they receive via social 
media.197 “Just 2% of individuals in the U.S. rely only on social media for 
news.”198 Interviews with Canadians who actively discuss politics on Twitter 
revealed that those same Twitter users relied on “mainstream news media” and 
face-to-face conversations with friends when gathering information about an 
“important” political issue.199 People are less trusting of social media than other 
sources for news.200 Still, the research on social media’s impact on behaviors 
and views is ongoing, and studies done just a few years ago may not accurately 
reflect current and future behaviors and feelings concerning social media. 
                                                        
197  Moreover, results of one survey suggest that the source of news may have some correla-
tion to a person’s level of civic participation. Dubois & Blank, supra note 111, at 733. From 
that survey, “television and magazine news consumption were found to be strongly related to 
increased civic participation while Internet-based news consumption was not.” Id. So, even 
if people do read news on the Internet and on social media, any impact of that news could be 
reduced partially or entirely if they do not vote or otherwise engage in civic activities. 
198  Id. (emphasis added). 
199  Id. 
200  See id. at 734; see also SMITH & ANDERSON, supra note 21 (asserting that 3 percent of 
social media users in the United States indicate they have “a lot of trust” in the sites they 
use). 
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2. Social Media Companies’ Efforts 
As discussed in Section II.C., social media companies are under pressure, 
especially after the 2016 election, to revisit their social media policies and prac-
tices.201 If tech companies receive sufficient pressure to rid their social media 
platforms of malicious bots and fake accounts, perhaps any social media user 
issues, including any issues judges might encounter, with “malicious bots” and 
fake accounts will fade away in the next few years. However, some have sug-
gested that social media platforms like Twitter have a “business incentive 
against weeding out bots too aggressively.”202 
3. Judges’ Media Consumption 
The “media diet” of a judge may very well avoid echo chambers. More re-
search needs to be done in this area to put judges’ use of social media in the 
context of their other media use. One recent study found that the likelihood of 
an echo chamber decreased with greater media diversity and greater interest in 
politics: “[R]egardless of how we measure the presence of an echo chamber, 
greater interest in politics and more media diversity reduces the likelihood of 
being in an echo chamber.”203 A judge with greater diversity in their “media 
diet” could be less likely to be subject to the potential risks of being in a social 
media bubble. 
B. Proposed Precautions 
As judges, primarily state judges and to some extent federal judges, in-
creasingly use social media, some precautions should be implemented and 
questions should continue to be raised. 
1. Spot and Avoid Bots 
Judges should make a reasonable effort to use a social media platform that 
effectively filters out bots, or use a platform that allows users to do so easily.204 
In one study involving Twitter, researchers applied filters including spam filters 
to try to ensure that all accounts in the study corresponded to real people.205 
                                                        
201  See supra Section II.C. 
202  See, e.g., Confessore et al., supra note 1. 
203  Dubois & Blank, supra note 111, at 740. 
204  Until social media platforms make a bot-free environment the default choice, judges 
would need to overcome status quo bias and confirmation bias in their social media use and 
choices. See, e.g., Eva Jonas et al., Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information Search After 
Preliminary Decisions: An Expansion of Dissonance Theoretical Research on Selective Ex-
posure to Information, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 557, 557 (2001); Daniel 
Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 
J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194–98 (1991); Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Biased Information Search 
in Group Decision Making, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 655, 655 (2000). 
205  Barberá et al., supra note 118, at 1534. 
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Even novice social media users can learn to spot some bots. Bots, for example, 
often have thousands of followers compared to just a few or no accounts being 
followed.206 Retweets from bot accounts can reflect a vast array of topics and 
languages.207 
However, judges who are overworked and who sit in courts that are under-
funded may not have sufficient time, training, or mental bandwidth to engage in 
efforts to filter out bots. Study may be needed to determine the feasibility of 
judges trying to spot and block bots in their social media usage. 
2. Have Diverse “Media Diets” 
As discussed in Section II.B., researchers Dubois and Blank found that 
those with a diverse media diet that included more than social media were more 
likely to encounter views and ideas different than their own.208 Even if judges 
encountered bubbles on social media created by themselves or by algorithms, 
or both, the research on social media use and ideological segregation suggests 
that judges can avoid possible negative effects of bubbles by reading and inter-
acting with a diverse set of media. Thus, as mentioned earlier, research on 
judges’ “media diets” may eventually help in determining any further steps that 
should be taken to curb the potential risks of social media bots and bubbles to 
judicial impartiality. 
3. Consider Comprehensive Approach 
State and federal judges can investigate whether approaches to social me-
dia security marketed to companies might work for the courts. Companies are 
advised by cybersecurity firms looking to secure clients to “take proactive 
measures” to safeguard their and their employees’ social media accounts, just 
as they protect their network.209 The firms advise partnering with IT and securi-
ty to take “a comprehensive approach” to address risks in the “broader social 
media ecosystem.”210 
However, the feasibility of such investigation may hinge on court funds 
available for IT support and infrastructure. 
                                                        
206  Confessore et al., supra note 1. 
207  Id. Articles abound in online media about how to spot a bot. See, e.g., Ryan Detert, Bot 
or Not: Seven Ways to Detect an Online Bot, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www. 
forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2018/08/06/bot-or-not-seven-ways-to-detect-an-online 
-bot/ [https://perma.cc/J855-JR2G]. 
208  See supra Section II.B. 
209  See Peter Horst, The Hackers Behind the Election Meddling Are Now Coming for Your 
Brand, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2018, 11:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterhorst/2018/10 
/23/the-hackers-behind-the-election-meddling-are-now-coming-for-your-brand/ [https://per 
ma.cc/FNY9-X3G8] (interviewing Otavio Freire, CTO and President of SafeGuardCyber). 
210  Id. 
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4. Revisit Judicial Ethics Rules Regularly 
As discussed above, although precautions can be taken and the impacts of 
bots and bubbles are still being researched, courts, judges, ethics committees, 
and scholars must regularly re-assess if the ethical rules must be adjusted to 
help maintain impartiality. For example, if judges’ media diets and efforts to 
minimize bots on their social media prove to be insufficient to counteract the 
ills of bots and bubbles threatening judicial impartiality, judicial ethics rules 
should be revisited for possible modification. 
A recent ABA ethics opinion discusses the issue of whether or not judges 
can use social media or the internet to find “adjudicative facts” and, in doing 
so, made a subtle distinction between social media and internet sites, on one 
hand, and books and judicial seminars, on the other. The opinion declares, no, 
judges cannot use social media or the internet to find “adjudicative facts,” rein-
forcing that the court may not decide a case based on facts other than those pre-
sented on the record or in court. The opinion, however, went further and recog-
nized that the internet is full of truth and of falsehoods, hinting perhaps that 
social media sites and internet sources are inherently more likely to be “biased, 
unreliable, or false” than books and seminars: 
Social media sites provide extensive information that users share about them-
selves and others. Information discovered on the Internet may be highly educa-
tional and as useful to judges as judicial seminars and books. But information 
gathered from an Internet search may not be accurate. It may be biased, unrelia-
ble, or false.211 
With further research and time to tell if the proposed precautions in this 
piece are feasible and effective to combat the effects of malicious or harmful 
social media bots and bubbles, judges, lawyers, scholars, bar associations, and 
judicial ethics committees may wish to re-examine if a revision to the judicial 
ethics rules is needed. The re-examination could begin with whether or not 
some instances of behavior of judges on social media should be specified as a 
situation in which “impartiality might be reasonably questioned” and therefore 
disqualification warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
With the presence of bots and bubbles on social media, judges on social 
media face a formidable threat to their ability to be impartial. Malicious bots 
have been the source of major security compromises and can play a key role in 
spreading falsehoods. Echo chambers and filter bubbles can help enhance the 
effects of bots. In a world where bots and bubbles’ impact are just beginning to 
be understood and their harmful impacts just beginning to be moderated, care 
must be taken so that judges maintain impartiality in their decision-making. 
The technology of social media bots and bubbles, and knowledge about the 
                                                        
211  ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 478, at 1 (2017). 
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consumption of social media by judges and others, are a moving target. Judges 
should be ever-vigilant and take precautions to ensure impartiality amidst bots 
and bubbles on social media. As long as these phenomena exist on social me-
dia, scholars, judges, bar associations, and ethics committees must regularly 
examine if further ethical limitations and guidelines are needed. State and fed-
eral ethics committees and bar associations should take the initiative and be 
proactive in investigating the risks to judicial impartiality posed by social me-
dia bots and bubbles.  
